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I. HIV/AIDS versus TNC 
 
The disastrous AIDS epidemic, the numbers killed by which worldwide have 
overtaken those of the dead in all civil wars of the 90s,
1 took a special turn in South 
Africa with the legal case “Hazel Tau vs. Glaxo and Boehringer”.
2 The case translates 
the multidimensional social issues into the narrower quaestiones juris: has the pricing 
policy of transnational pharmaceutical enterprises violated fundamental human 
rights? Can AIDS patients assert their right to life directly against transnational 
corporations? Does “Access to Medication as a Human Right” exist in the private 
sector?
3 More generally, do fundamental rights obligate not only States, but also 
private transnational actors directly? 
 
39 pharmaceutical firms, represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' 
Association of South Africa (PMASA), invoked South Africa’s national courts.
4 In 
October 2003 the national  Competition Commission had to decide whether the 
complainants had an actionable right to access to HIV medications against the firms 
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim. From the technical legal viewpoint, they 
based their legal position on the point that the pharmaceutical firms had breached 
Art. 8(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 by charging excessive prices for 
antiretrovirals, to the detriment of consumers. They accused private collective actors 
of violating human rights: “The excessive pricing of ARVs is directly responsible for 
premature, predictable and avoidable deaths of people living with HIV/AIDS, 
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including both children and adults.”
5 The surprising outcome was that the South 
African Competition Commission basically found for the complainants, even though it 




The “horizontal” effect of fundamental rights, i.e. the question whether they 
impose obligations not only on governmental bodies but also directly on private 
actors, is taking on much more dramatic dimensions in the transnational sphere than 
it ever had nationally. It not only arises for human-rights infringements by 
pharmaceutical enterprises in the worldwide AIDS epidemic,
7 but has already raised 
a stir in several scandals in which transnational corporations were involved.
8 I shall 
single out a few glaring cases: environmental pollution and inhuman treatment of 
local population groups, e.g. by Shell in Nigeria;
9 the chemical accident in Bhopal;
10 
disgraceful working conditions in ‘sweatshops’ in Asia and Latin America;
11 child 
labour at IKEA and NIKE;
12 the suspicions levied against sports goods manufacturer 
Adidas of having footballs produced in China by forced labour;
13 the use of highly 
poisonous pesticides in banana plantations;
14 disappearances of unionized 
workers;
15 environmental damage from big construction projects.
16 The list could 
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easily be extended. The scandalous events fill volumes. At the core is the accusation 




In the transnational sphere it is extremely hard to fall back on patterns of 
solution familiar from national constitutional law. While these have dealt with the 
horizontal effect of fundamental rights, they usually dodge the ticklish point of 
whether private actors are subject to direct fundamental-rights obligations by 
developing a host of doctrines whereby fundamental rights have only “indirect” effects 
in the private sector.
18 Simplifying grossly, there are two constructions to be found in 
numerous variants. On the State action doctrine, private actors are in principle 
excluded from the binding effect of fundamental rights, unless some element of State 
action can be identified in their actions, whether because State bodies are involved 
or because they themselves perform public functions.
19 On the doctrine of the 
structural effect of fundamental rights those rights impact on the whole legal system 
including private law enacted by the State, so that fundamental rights must be 
observed in the private sector, but the restriction to the legal system simultaneously 




In the transnational private sector the question whether collective actors are 
themselves bound by fundamental rights arises much more acutely. Here the 
otherwise omnipresent State and national law are almost absent, so that State action 
and structural legal effect of fundamental rights apply in only a few situations. On the 
other hand, transnational private actors, especially transnational corporations, 
regulate whole areas of life through private governance regimes of their own, so that 
the question of fundamental rights can no longer be evaded. 
 
This faces legal policy and constitutional legal theory with enormous problems. 
Yet it would be simplistic to politicize the question directly, to reduce it to the political 
bifurcation between neo-liberal and social-democratic conceptions of fundamental 
rights, hegemonic or anti-hegemonic strategies or Empire vs. Multitude.
21 That would 
                                                                                                                                                          
16 Perez, Oren (2004): Ecological Sensitivity and Global Legal Pluralism: Rethinking the Trade and 
Environment Conflict, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
17 Baker, Mark B. (2001): "Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American 
Transnational Corporation", Wisconsin International Law Journal, 89 et seq. 
18 For a comparative view, Friedman, Daniel and Barak-Erez, Daphne (eds) (2001): Human Rights in 
Private Law, Oxford: Hart, 1 et seq.; Anderson, Gavin W. (2004): "Social Democracy and the Limits of 
Rights Constitutionalism", 17 The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, 31 et seq.; for England, 
Campbell, T., Ewing, K. D. and Tomkins, A. (eds.): Sceptical Essays on Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford 
University, 1 et seq., at 4; for Israel,  Barak, Aharon (1996): "Constitutional Human Rights and Private 
Law", 3 Review of Constitutional Studies, 218 et seq., for South Africa: Cheadle, H. and Davis, D. 
(1996): "The Application of the 1996 Constitution in the Private Sphere", 12 African Journal of Human 
Rights, 44 et seq. 
19 See the comparative analysis of Anderson (fn. 18), 31 et seq. 
20 This implication becomes obvious at Canaris, Claus-Wilhelm (1999): Grundrechte und Privatrecht. 
Eine Zwischenbilanz, Berlin: de Gruyter, 11 et seq.; a critique of this approach, Brüggemeier, Gert 
(2005): "Horizontal Effects of Fundamental Rights. A Critical View on the German Cathedral and 
Beyond", forthcoming, 15 et seq. 
21 On the political strategies of societal constitutionalism see Anderson (fn. 18), 33 et seq.;  Hardt, 
Michael and Negri, Antonio (2004): Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, New York:   4
be tantamount to a political decision between either exclusively State-oriented validity 
of fundamental rights, or else their enforcement throughout society.
22 I suggest 
instead leaving the beaten tracks and going a roundabout way through somwehat 
obscure territories of legal and social theory. The detour is starting with what I call 
divisional concepts of fundamental rights and ending with ecological ones. This will 
open up a different view of fundamental rights in the transnational private sector. It 
amounts to the following question: Can the horizontal effect of fundamental rights be 
rethought, from interpersonal conflicts between individual bearers of fundamental 
rights to conflicts between the anonymous matrices of communication on the one 
hand and concrete individuals on the other? Can we understand human rights in 
private sectors in such a way that individuals assert their rights against the structural 
violence of apersonal communicative processes? 
  
II. Divisional concepts of fundamental rights 
What does one gain and what does one lose by taking this detour? What 
happens if we see the fundamental-rights question no longer as a problem of 
balancing among rights of actors, but as an “ecological” problem:  as a damage that 
an expansive social system does to its social, human and natural ecologies? Applied 
to our question, what do we gain from it for the horizontal effect of human rights in 
globalized sectors of society, outside of institutionalized politics? 
 
The European tradition has always aspired, in the search for just institutions, 
to an “appropriate” balance between society as a whole and its parts. It has always 
oscillated between experiences of a divided society and abstract conceptions of the 
appropriateneness of its internal balance. Justice to people by the institutions was 
the heuristic formula by which legal semantics reacted to changes in the social 
structure.
23 The concept responded anew in each case to painful experience of 
society’s internal divisions. Can a fair balance among individuals and between them 
and society be found in spite of these divisions? Or in non-individualist versions, can 
there be a fair balance among parts of society – estates, classes, strata, interest 
groups, ethnic and cultural identities, social spheres, sub-rationalities – and between 
the parts and society as a whole? Or can institutional justice be achieved at all only 
once society’s divisions have been overcome and a new unity of society brought 
about? 
 
Justice to people by the institutions was seen on this view, which I shall call 
divisional, as a problem of society’s internal division into unequal parts – or more 
dramatically, of its destructive cleavages, its power and distribution struggles, its 
antagonistic conflicts. How is an equitable unity of society to be guaranteed despite 
its self-destructive fragmentation? The classical answer was: Do not eliminate the 
divisions, but equilibrate them through suum cuique! Neutralize the dangerous 
divisive tendencies by assigning to the parts their due place in the overall order! 
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Actual human beings were regarded as components of society and justice was done 
to them, through the familiar formulas of justitia distributiva –  the whole allotting to 
the parts (individuals, groups, sectors) their due share – and justitia commutativa –  
the equitable relation of the parts (individuals, groups, sectors) to each other. 
 
Though the divisional view always predominated, the relation of whole to parts 
and the fair balance between them was perceived differently in the course of history. 
Feudal society primarily regulated the relations of the estates with each other. It 
guaranteed justice as the naturally-given hierarchy between the partes majores, 
which at the same time represented the whole of society, understood as corpus, and 
the partes minores. Human individuals were always transcended in the estate or in 
the corporation.
24 Subjective rights were not thinkable, still less fundamental rights, 
as strictly unilateral entitlements in the modern sense. Instead, the prevailing 
conception was that of ius, as a complex relation of divisional balance, fair in itself, 
between parts of different kinds, such as between feudal lords and vassals, as 
relations of loyalty and care in hierarchical reciprocity.
25 
 
The bourgeois revolution rebelled against the injustice of distributive 
relationships between the estates. It responded to the divisional injustice by calling 
for the equality of all parts of society. The fundamental rights in particular followed a 
new logic which however remained divisional: freedom of the parts in relation to the 
whole of society, equality among them, and solidarity as mutual support. Liberal 
theories thought through the new divisionalism consistently to its end. Society 
consists only of individuals. Fairness is guaranteed by self-regulating invisible hands 
which, underpinned by fundamental rights, coordinate the individuals’ autonomous 
spheres: economic markets, political elections, competition of opinions, free play of 
scientific knowledge. Interventions of compensatory justice are admissible only for 
rectifying the self-regulation among the parts.  
 
The proletarian revolution’s theory of society again takes a divisional 
approach. The totality of society consists of the social classes that spring from 
economic structural contradictions. Justice will only become possible once the 
classless society is born out of their antagonistic conflicts. In social-democratic 
Welfare State conceptions, the parts of society, the classes, are transformed into 
socio-economic strata. Here again there is a divisional view, especially of the second-
generation fundamental rights. Social and participatory rights are aimed at 




Ultimately, the great social theories also follow divisional patterns. This is 
clearest in concepts of a social division of labour that finds the fair balance in organic 
rather than mechanical solidarity.
27 In classical functionalism, the divisional element 
is to be found in the fact that a balance comes about through exchange relations 
among different functional spheres, and ultrastability is brought by compensatory 
                                                 
24 Gierke, Otto von (1902): "Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände", Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 26 
et seq. 
25 Villey, Michel (1957): Leçons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit, Paris: Dalloz, 249 et seq. 
26 For example Rothstein, B. (1998): Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the 
Universal Welfare State, Cambridge: Cambridge University. 
27 Durkheim, Emile (1997): The Division of Labor in Society, New York: Free Press, 68 et seq.   6
mechanisms when there are occasional disruptions, if necessary through State 
compensation out of the proceeds of growth.
28 And in conflict theories insoluble 
permanent conflicts replace the just balance among the parts. In the polytheism of 
modernity among differing spheres of rationality, the hope for a lasting fair balance 
has given way to a resigned acquiescience in a chain of tragic decisions.
29 
 
Specifically for human rights, these divisional theories of society have the 
consequence that they are conceived of as rights of the parts against the State, 
which represents the whole of society.
30 Doctrines on the horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights in the private sector follow this divisional approach.
31 What is 
involved is the distribution of society’s unevenly divided resources – power, wealth, 
knowledge – on the pattern of justitia distributiva or commutativa. This means either 
an extension of the State-citizen distributive pattern into society, or else resource 
allocation on the commutative pattern: fundamental rights as rights of the parts of 
society against each other. When the political human rights are applied directly to 
citizen-citizen-relations, a balance of the individual fundamental-rights positions of 
private actors against each other is drawn.
32  All in all, though, it remains unclear how 
far and on what terms fundamental rights can claim validity in non-political sectors of 
society. 
 
III. Ecological concepts of fundamental rights 
There is a deeper question, though: Is it at all appropriate to see the justice of 
institutions as divisional (distributive) justice between the whole and the parts (or, 
among the parts)? And to regard human rights as guarantees – formal, material or 
procedural – to individuals against the societal whole, the State as organizational 
form of the overall society (or, reciprocal guarantees by the parts)? 
  
Systems theory here puts a different question: Is the internal division of society 
that creates injustice as inequality among people not just a secondary phenomenon? 
Society’s internal divisions should be understood otherwise, namely as resulting from 
the interaction of communicative networks with their environment. Actual people are 
not at the centre of these networks, nor can they get back inside them.  People are 
the  environment for the communicative networks, to whose operations they are 
exposed without being able to control them.  Systems theory argues that the 
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autonomy of communicative networks excludes people radically from society.
33 
Systems theory is here coming close to theorems of social alienation from the 
tradition of social theory.
34 At this point there are secret contacts with officially hostile 
theories: with Foucault’s analyses of disciplinary power, Agamben’s critique of social 
exclusion, Lyotard’s theory of closed discourses and Derrida’s deconstruction of 
justice, even if these contacts are officially denied on all sides.
35 This can only be 
indicated here, not enlarged on. 
 
The legal follow-up question is: If people are not parts of society, but for ever 
banished from it, how are human rights to be reformulated? Whereas the tradition 
saw the question of just institutions as being created by the internal divisions of society, 
and therefore aimed at institutional justice despite differences, today much presumably 
argues in favour of distinguishing the social system from its natural and human 
environment, and consequently describing  institutional justice as difference: as 
responsiveness within the unbridgeable gap between social institutions and actual 
people. The reaction to this difference cannot be inclusion, but at the most 
responsiveness. Human rights are then not a response to distribution problems within 
society, but an answer to problems that transcend society. Human rights demand an 
ecological sensitivity of communication. And the next follow-up question is: Does the 
far-advanced fragmentation of society not in turn create new internal boundaries, with 
other subsystems on the one hand and with environments outside society on the 
other, so that the fairness of specialized social institutions too can only properly be 
posed as an ecological problem? 
 
Such an ecological perception of fundamental rights as “just”  boundary 
relations between social systems and their various internal and external ecologies 
takes on two new dimensions if we compare it with divisional theories that see people 
as parts of society and justice as a problem of inequality. First, there is the 
insurmountable difference between communication and people in its environment. 
Can communication, then, ever at all do justice to people? The second dimension is 
that the question is no longer one of distribution of social resources in the broadest 
sense, i.e. power, wealth, knowledge, life chances, among the parts of society. 
Instead, the point is to constrain the institutions’ acts in such a way that they do 
justice to the intrinsic rights of their social and human ecologies. The overcoming of 
inequality among people and the fair distribution of resources is then replaced by two 
quite different demands on social institutions: (1) internal and external limitation of 
their expansive tendencies; (2) sensitive balancing between their intrinsic rationality 
and the intrinsic rights of their ecologies. 
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The human-rights tradition is thereby accused of not taking human individuals 
seriously.
36 This is not despite but because of its basic humanistic approach, which 
leads it – against its better knowledge – to set human beings at the centre of the 
institutions. The category error of the divisional tradition could be formulated using 
Magritte’s familiar caption: ceci n’est pas une pipe; or in the fundamental-rights 
context: la personne n’est pas un être humain. Traditional thought, by understanding 
fundamental rights as areas of personal autonomy, brings about a fatal equation of 
“mind/body” on the one hand and “person” on the other.
37 But if one takes the 
difference seriously by seeing the “person” as a mere internal construct of social 
communication on the one hand, and mind and body as living, pulsing entities in the 
communication’s environment on the other, then it becomes clear that the humanistic 
equation of semantic artefacts with actual people is precisely what does not do 
justice to blood-and-flesh people.  
 
That people are not parts of society but insuperably separate from it, has one 
inexorable consequence:
38 society and mind/body  are not communicatively 
accessible to each other. Mind and body are each independent, self-sustaining 
(mental or organic) processes. Both have certainly brought about communication, but 
cannot control it. Communication becomes autonomous from people, creating its own 
world of meaning over against the individual mind. This can be used by people 
productively for their survival, but it can also – and this is the point at which 
fundamental rights become relevant – turn against them and threaten their integrity, 
or even terminate their existence. Extreme examples are: killing through a chain of 
command, sweatshops as a consequence of anonymous market forces, martyrs as a 
result of religious communication, political or military torture as destruction of identity. 
 
It is in these negative externalities of communication, in their potential to 
threaten mind and body, that the core of the human-rights problematique lies – not, 
as the tradition supposed, in social inequality among human beings! The 
environment-threatening potential of society seen as a communicative ensemble is 
by no means in contradiction with its operative closure; on the contrary, it is its 
consequence. To be sure, their mutual closure makes society and people 
inaccessible to each other. Communicative processes cannot penetrate body and 
mind; they are external to communication. But communication can irritate psycho-
physical processes in such a way as to threaten their self-preservation. Or it may 
simply destroy them. This is the place where body and mind of individuals (not of 
“persons”) come up against their “pre-legal”, “pre-political”, even “pre-social” (= extra-
societal) “latent intrinsic rights”
39. They insist on their identity and their self-
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preservation against destructive perturbations of communication – and at the same 
time without having any forum available before which they could assert these “rights”. 
And human rights in the strict sense should be restricted to this “crass” matter of 
society threatening mental and physical integrity and not burdened with quite 
different problems of social communication – the relevance of which for fundamental 
rights in the broader sense is by no means thereby denied.
40 
  
These latent “rights” become overt, however, only if bodily pain and mental 
suffering no longer remain unheard in their speechlessness, but succeed in  irritating 
society’s communication and set off new distinctions there. The ill-treated bodies’ and 
souls’ defences can be “heard” only if themselves expressed in communication. 
Those are the social messages of physical violence as anti-power communication, or 
of suffering souls complaining and protesting. Only then is there a chance for social 
conflicts about the core area of human rights to develop.  But these can only ever be 
proxies, able correspondingly only to re-present people in communication, not 
present them. These communicative conflicts are in no way identical with the real 
conflict that the communication sets going in relation to its ecologies, mind and body. 
Nor do they reflect them acccurately, but are merely resonances within society of the 
external conflicts, mere reconstructions of ecological conflicts within the 
communication. They then result in rules internal to communication, which in their 
turn can neither regulate nor protect mind and body. But they can in complicated 
fashion become relevant for both, if social rules ultimately set extra-communicative 
bounds on the communication. Here is where the law’s central figure – the legal 
prohibition: thou shall not – derives its effect beyond the boundaries of the 
communicative: prohibitions of particular communications (ban on killing, ban on 
torture). Thus “latent rights” (= intrinsic claims of flesh-and-blood people to bodily and 
mental integrity) become “living rights” in Eugen Ehrlichs sense and “human rights” in 
the non-technical legal sense, which can be fought for anywhere in society (not just in 
law or in politics). (This is not to be confused with the distinction in legal philosophy 
between rights in the state of nature and in the civil state). 
 
That is why it makes no sense to see human rights as a decision of the 
political sovereign – whether the prince or the self-governing people –  in the positive 
law. While they do not represent, of course, natural law rights in the sense of some 
pre-political absolute validity, they are pre-social (extra-social) in a quite different 
sense, as being based on “latent rights” of body and mind to their integrity, and at the 
same time they are “pre-political” and “pre-legal”, as being built on the “living law” of 
human rights arising out of communicative conflicts in politics, morals, religion or law, 
and the resulting conquests. Positivizing them as technical law is not some free 
decision of the legislator, but is based on this twofold foundation of self-sustaining 
processes outside society and conflicts within it. 
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IV. Fundamental rights as a problem of modernity: expansion of political power
   
The problem of “latent human rights” thus always arises whenever there is 
communication at all: as “intrinsic rights” of organic life and of mental experience, vis-
à-vis the endangerment of their integrity by social communication. In old Europe this 
was, however, “translated” into the semantics not of human rights, but of the 
perfection of man in imperfect nature, or of the soul’s salvation in the corrupt world. 
The original Fall of Man happens at the Tree of Knowledge: the meaning-producing 
force of communication, with its ability to distinguish good and evil, destroys the 
original unity of man and nature, makes man godlike and leads to the loss of 
Paradise. The origin of alienation lies in the very first communication. 
 
Human rights in their specific modern sense appear only with the second Fall. 
It does not, as for Marx, coincide with the emergence of private property, but with the 
autonomization of a multiplicity of separate communicative worlds. First, and 
everywhere visibly since Macchiavelli, the matrix of politics becomes autonomous. It 
becomes detached from the diffuse moral-religious-economic ties of the old 
European society, and extends to infinity the usurpation potential of its special 
medium, power, without any immanent restraints. Its operative closure and its 
structural autonomy let it create new environments for itself, vis-à-vis which it 
develops expansive, indeed downright imperialist tendencies. Absolute power 
liberates unsuspected destructive forces. Centralized power for legitimate collective 
decisions, which develops a special language of its own, indeed a high-flown 
rationality of the political, has an inherent tendency to totalize them beyond limit.
41  
 
Its expansion goes in two diverse directions. First, it crosses the boundaries to 
other social sectors. Their response is to insist on their communicative autonomy free 
of intervention by politics – this is the birth of fundamental rights, either as institutional 
or as personal right to autonomy. Fundamental rights demarcate from politics areas 
of autonomy allotted either to social institutions or to persons as social constructs.
42 
In both cases fundamental rights set bounds on the totalizing tendencies of the 
political matrix within society. Second, politics expands with particular verve across 
the boundaries of society, in its endeavours to control the human mind and body. 
Their defences become effective only once they can be communicated as protest in 
complaints and in violence, are translated socially into political struggles of the 
oppressed against their oppressors, and finally end up, via historical compromises, in 
political guarantees of the self-limitation of politics vis-à-vis people as psycho-
physical entities. These are, - unlike the previously mentioned institutional and 
personal fundamental rights, human rights in the strict sense. 
 
The fundamental-rights tradition has not separated these “latent” human rights 
distinctly from individual and institutional fundamental, but has always translated 
them into compact individual fundamental rights, through a re-entry of the external 
into the internal. Communication cannot guarantee or regulate the autonomy of the 
mind, nor even describe it appropriately with any prospect of a correspondence 
between percept and object. The difference between communication and mind is 
unbridgeable. But this difference is repeated within communication via re-entry. The 
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same applies to the difference communication/body. Human beings (mind and body) 
which are not accessible to communication, are modelled within the law as “persons”, 
as “bearers of fundamental rights”, without any guarantee for correspondence 
between constructs of persons within society and people outside it. It is to these 
artefacts of communication that actions are attributed and areas of freedom granted 
as fundamental rights. The tradition here makes the pernicious equation of person 
and human being already criticized above, in the unitary concept of individual 
fundamental rights. It does not distinguish sufficiently between guarantees of 
communicative freedoms on the one hand and guarantees of psycho-physical 
integrity on the other. Against this, we must insist on the difference between personal 
rights and human rights in the strict sense. Human rights in this sense too depend on 
the technique of re-entry, thus on their attribution to communicative constructs, but 
are to be understood as having a semantic difference from personal communicative 
freedoms, namely as intended guarantees of the integrity of mind and body. 
 
V. Fragmentation of society: multiplication of expansive social systems   
This model of fundamental rights which is oriented toward politics and the 
State, works only as long as the State can be identified with society, or at least, the 
State regarded as society’s organizational form, and politics as its hierarchical 
coordination. However, insofar other highly specialized communicative media 
(money, knowledge, law, medicine, technology) gain autonomy, this model loses its 
plausibility. At this point, horizontal effects of fundamental and human rights become 
relevant. Fragmentation of society multiplies the boundary zones between 
autonomized communicative matrices and human beings. The new territories of 
meaning each draw boundaries of their own with their human environments. Here 
new dangers arise for the integrity of body and mind. These are the issues to which 
the “third-party effect” of human rights in the strict sense should be confined. Another, 
no less important, set of issues of constitutional rights would be the autonomy of 
institutional communicative spheres vis-à-vis their “private” subjugation, and a third 
the autonomy of personal communicative freedoms.
43 
 
Thus, human rights cannot be limited to the relation between State and 
individual, or the area of institutionalized politics, or even only to phenomena of 
power in the broadest sense.
44 Specific endangerment of physical and mental 
integrity by a communicative matrix comes not just from politics, but in principle from 
all social sectors that have expansive tendencies. For the matrix of the economy, 
Marx clarified this particularly through such concepts as alienation, autonomy of 
capital, commodification of the world, exploitation of man by man. Today we see – 
most clearly in Foucault, Agamben, Legendre
45 – similar threats to integrity from the 
                                                 
43 The institutional aspect is emphasized by Ladeur (fn. 32) 64: “Fundamental rights are then a 
contribution to the self-reflection of the private law, when – as with the third-party effect of 
communicative freedom - it is about the protection of non-economical interests and goods.“  
44 Reducing the horizontal effect of fundamental rights to “social power“ along the lines of political 
power is common in labor law. Facing organisational power this stands to reason, yet reduces the 
question of fundamental rights to a mere phenomenon of balancing powers. See Gamillscheg, Franz 
(1964): "Die Grundrechte im Arbeitsrecht", 164 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis, 385-445. Explicit 
political concepts concerning the horizontal effect of fundamental rights exhibit similar reductions, e.g. 
Anderson (fn. 18), 33. 
45 Agamben, Giorgio (1998): Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 15 et seq.; Foucault, Michel (1991): Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison,   12
matrices of the natural sciences, of psychology, the social sciences, technology and 
medicine, of the press, radio and television (keywords: Dr. Mengele
46, reproductive 




By now it should have become clear why it makes no sense to talk about the 
“horizontal effect” of political fundamental rights. There is no transfer from the State 
guarantees of individual freedoms into “horizontal” relations between private actors. 
Something else is instead needed – to develop new types of guarantee that limit the 
destructive potential of communication outside institutionalized politics against body 
and mind. The State-action approach thus falls short by letting fundamental rights 
operate in the private sector only if trace elements of State action can be identified. 
And the economic-power approach misleads too, by seeing fundamental rights only 
as a response to power phenomena. This is much too narrow, since while social 
power is covered by it, the subtler endangerments to integrity from other 
communicative matrices, e. g. by the monetary mechanism, are not. 
 
Accordingly, it is today the fragmentation of society that is central to the 
human-rights question. There is not just one single boundary political 
communication/individual, guarded by human rights. Instead, the problems arise in 
numerous social institutions, each forming their own boundaries with their human 
environments:  politics/individual, economy/individual, law/individual, 
science/individual, medicine/individual (never as a whole/part relation, but understood 
as difference between communication and mind/body). Everything then comes down 
to identifying the various frontier posts, so as to recognize the violations that 
endanger human integrity by their specific characteristics. Where are the frontier 
posts? – Answer: in the various constructs of persons in the subsystems: homo 
politicus, oeconomicus, juridicus, organizatoricus, retalis etc. These are constructs 
within communication, enabling classification, but at the same time real points of 
contact with people “out there”. It is through the mask of the “person” that the social 
systems make contact to people; while they cannot communicate with them, they can 
massively irritate them and in turn be irritated by them. In tight perturbation cycles, 
communication irritates consciousness with its selective “enquiries”, conditioned by 
assumptions about rational actors, and is irritated by the “answers”, in turn highly 
selectively conditioned. It is in this recursiveness that the “exploitation” of man by the 
social systems (not by man!) comes about. The social system as a specialized 
communicative process concentrates its irritations of human beings on the person-
constructs. It “sucks” mental and physical energies from them for its own self-
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preservation. It is only in this highly specific way that Foucault’s disciplinary 
mechanisms develop their specific effects.
48 
VI.  The anonymous matrix 
If violations of fundamental rights stem from totalizing tendencies of partial 
rationalities, then there is no longer any point in seeing the horizontal effect of 
fundamental rights as if it rights of private actors have to be weighed up against each 
other. But the root of infringement of fundamental rights need to be looked at closer. 
The simple part-whole view of society has after-effects in the image of “horizontality”, 
unacceptably taking the sting out of the whole human-rights issue, as if the sole point 
were that individuals threaten other individuals.  
 
Violation of the integrity of individuals by other individuals, whether through 
communication or direct physical action, is, however, a completely different set of 
issues, that arose long before the radical fragmentation of society in our days. It must 
systematically be separated from the fundamental-rights question as such.
49 In the 
European tradition it is (alongside other constructions) translated by attributing to 
persons, as communicative representatives of actual human beings, “subjective 
rights” against each other. This was philosophically expanded by the theory of 
subjective rights in the Kantian tradition, according to which ideally the citizens’ 
spheres of arbitrary freedom are demarcated from each other in such a way that the 
rights can take a generalizable form. Legally, this idea has been most clearly 
developed in classical law of tort, in which not merely demnifications, but violations of 
subjective rights are central. Now, “fundamental rights” in their institutional, personal 
and human dimensions, as here proposed, differ from “subjective rights” in private 
law. They are not about mutual endangerment of private individuals, i.e. 
intersubjective relations, but about dangers to the integrity of institutions, persons 
and individuals which are created by anonymous communicative matrices 
(institutions, discourses, systems).  
 
The Anglo-American tradition speaks in both cases indifferently about “rights”, 
thereby overlooking from the outset the fundamental distinction between subjective 
rights and fundamental rights, while in turn being able to deal with them together. By 
contrast, criminal law concepts of macro-criminality and criminal responsibility of 
formal organizations come close to the issues in mind here.
50 They affect violations 
of norms not emanating from human beings, but from nonpersonal social 
processes.
51 But they are confined to the dangers stemming from “collective actors” 
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(States, political parties, business firms, groups of companies, associations) and miss 
the dangers stemming from the anonymous “matrix”, from autonomized 
communicative processes (institutions, functional systems, networks) that are not 
personified as collectives. Even political human rights should not be seen as relations 
between political actors (State vs. citizen), i.e. as an expression of person-person 
relations. Instead, they are relations between anonymous power processes on the 
one hand and tortured bodies and hurt souls on the other. This is expressed in 
communication only very imperfectly, not to say misleadingly, as the relation between 
the State as “person” and the “persons” of the individuals. 
  
It would be repeating the infamous category error of the tradition were one to 
treat the horizontal effect of fundamental rights in terms of subjective rights between 
individual persons.
52 That would just end up in law of tort, with its interpersonal 
relations. And we would be forced to apply the concrete State-oriented fundamental 
rights wholesale to the most varied interpersonal relations, with disastrous 
consequences for elective freedoms in private life. Here lies the rational core of the 
excessive protests of private lawyers against the intrusion of fundamental rights into 
private law –  though they in turn are exaggerated and overlook the real issues.
53  
 
The category error can be avoided. Both the “old” political and the “new” 
polycontextural human-rights question should be understood as people being 
threatened not by their fellows, but by anonymous communicative processes. These 
must in the first place be identified. Focault has seen them most clearly, radically 
depersonalizing the phenomenon of power and identifying today’s micro-power 
relations in society’s capillaries as the expression of discourses/practices of 
“disciplines” (Foucault’s problem is, to be sure, his quite obsessive fixation on the 
phenomenon of power, which leads him to inflate the concept of power 




We can now summarize the outcome of our abstract considerations. The 
human-rights question in the strictest sense must today be seen as endangerment of 
individuals’ body/mind integrity by a multiplicity of anonymous and today globalized 
communicative processes. The fragmentation of world society into autonomous 
subsystems creates new boundaries outside society between subsystem and human 
being and new boundaries inside society between the various subsystems. The 
expansive tendencies of the subsystems aim in both directions.
55 It now becomes 
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clear how the new “equation” replaces the old “equation” of the horizontal effect. The 
old one was based on a relation between two private actors – private perpetrator and 
private victim of the infringement.  On one side of the new equation is no longer a 
private actor as the fundamental-rights violator, but the anonymous matrix of an 
autonomized communicative medium. On its other side is no longer simply the 
compact individual. Instead, protection of the individual, hitherto seen in unitary 
terms, splits up because of the new boundaries into several dimensions. On this 
other side of the equation, the fundamental rights have to be systematically divided 
into three or even four dimensions: 
 
- institutional rights protecting the autonomy of social discourses – the autonomy of 
art, of science, of religion - against their subjugation by the totalizing tendencies of 
the communicative matrix. By protecting them against totalitarian tendencies of 
science, media or economy fundamental rights take effect as “conflict of law rules” 
between partial rationalities in society.
56  
 
-  personal rights protecting the autonomy of communications, attributed not to 
institutions, but to the social artefacts called “persons”.  
 
- human rights as negative bounds on societal communication, where the integrity of 
individuals’ body and mind is endangered by a communicative matrix crossing 
boundaries.  
 
(- additionally, though not systematically discussed here: ecological rights, where 
society endangers the integrity of natural processes). 
 
It should be stressed that specific fundamental rights are to be allocated to 
these dimensions not one-to-one, but with a multiplicity of overlaps. Some 
fundamental rights are mainly to be attributed to one dimension or the other (e.g. 
freedom of art, freedom of science, and property primarily to the institutional, freedom 
of speech primarily to the personal and freedom of conscience primarily to the 
human-rights dimension). Some display all three dimensions (e.g. religious freedom). 
It is all the more important, then, to distinguish the three dimensions carefully within 
the various fundamental rights. 
VII. Justiciability?  
Let us now concentrate on the third dimension, human rights in the strictest 
sense, protecting the integrity of mind and body. The ensuing question for lawyers is: 
Can “horizontal” effects of fundamental rights be reformulated from conflicts within 
society (person vs. person) to conflicts between society and its ecologies 
(communication vs. body/mind)? In other words, from interpersonal conflicts between 
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individual bearers of fundamental rights to ecological conflicts between anonymous 
communicative processes on the one hand and concrete people on the other? 
 
The difficulties are enormous. To list only a few:  
 
How can destructive system/environment relations “between” the universes   
Communication and Consciousness at all be addressed by communication as a 
conflict, as social conflict or indeed as legal conflict – a real Lyotard problem: if not as 
litige, then at least as différend? Failing a supreme court for meaning, all that can 
happen is that mental experience endures the infringement and then fades away 
unheard. Or else it gets “translated” into communication, but then the paradoxical and 
highly unlikely demand will be for the infringer of the right (society, communication) to 
punish its own crime! That means turning poachers into gamekeepers. But bear in 
mind: several nation states have already, by institutionalizing political fundamental 
rights, managed precisely this gamekeeper-poacher self-limitation – however 
imperfectly.  
 
How can the law describe the boundary conflict, when after all it has only the 
language of “rights” of “persons” available?
57 Can it, in this impoverished rights talk, 
in any way construct the difference between interpersonal conflicts and 
communicative endangerments of individuals via external social conflicts? Here we 
reach the limits of what is conceivable in legal doctrine, and the limits of court 
proceedings as well. In them, there must always be a claimant suing a defendant for 
infringing his rights. In this framework of mandatory binarization as person/person-
conflicts, can human rights at all be asserted against the structural violence of 
anonymous communicative processes? The only way this can happen – at any rate 
in litigation – is simply to re-use the category error so harshly criticized above, but 
immanently correcting it, in an awareness of its falsehood, by introducing a 
difference. That means individual suits against private actors, in which human rights, 
though not rights of persons against persons but of flesh-and-blood human beings 
against structural violence of the matrix, are asserted. In traditional terms, the conflict 
with institutional problems that is really meant has to take place within individual 
forms of action. We are already familiar with something similar from existing 
institutional theories of fundamental rights, which recognize as their bearers not only 
persons, but also institutions.
58 Who enforces the individual freedom of opinion 
simultaneously protects the integrity of the political process. But the point here is not 
rights of impersonal institutions against the State but, in a multiple inversion of the 
relation, rights of individuals outside society against social institutions outside the 
State. 
 
Is this distinction justiciable? Can person/person-conflicts be separated from 
individual/individual-conflicts on the one hand, and these in turn from 
communication/individual-conflicts on the other hand, if after all communication is 
enabled only via persons? Translated into the language of law, this becomes a 
problem of attribution. Whodunnit? Under what conditions can the concrete 
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endangerment of integrity be attributed not to persons/individuals, but to anonymous 
communication processes? If so, then a genuine human-rights problem would have 
been formulated even in the impoverished rights talk of the law.
59  
 
In an extreme simplification, the “horizontal” human-rights problematique can 
perhaps be described in familiar legal categories as follows. The problem of human 
rights in private law arises only where the endangerment of body/mind integrity 
comes from social “institutions” (and not just from individual actors). Institutions in 
principle cover private formal organizations and private regulatory systems. The most 
important cases would here be business firms, private associations, hospitals, 
schools, universities as formal organizations; and general terms of trade, private 
standardization and similar rule-settings as private regulatory systems. We must of 
course be clear that the term institution only imperfectly represents the chains of 
communicative acts endangering integrity, characterized by a special medium, that 
are really meant – the metaphor of the anonymous “matrix” – and barely makes its 
expansive dynamic visible. But for lawyers, oriented toward rules and persons, it has 
the advantage of defining the institution as a bundle of norms and at the same time 
letting it be personified. The concept of the institution could accordingly respecify 
fundamental rights in social sectors (as it were, the equivalent for the State as 
institution and as person in the range of politics). The outcome would then be a 
formula of “third-party effect” plausible also to the black-letter lawyer: not horizontal 
effect as a balancing between the fundamental rights of individual bearers of them, 
but instead human rights and rights of discourses vis-à-vis expansive social 
institutions. 
 
VIII. HIV/AIDS versus TNC 
 
Let us, with now heightened but at the same time lowered expectations, take 
another look at the HIV catastrophe in South Africa. I cannot offer a solution, but at 
best suggest directions the human rights might develop in. It should be fairly clear 
how inadequate it is to weigh up patients’ individual fundamental right to life against 
the TNCs’ individual property right in court proceedings. The matter is not one of 
corporate social responsibility, with a single corporate actor infringing fundamental 
rights of AIDS patients through pricing policy. A human right of access to medication 
can become a reality only if the “horizontal” effect of fundamental rights is 
reformulated from interpersonal conflicts (person vs. person) to system/environment 
conflicts (communication vs. body/soul, or institution vs. institution). 
 
In the institutional dimension, the conflict needs to be set in its social context, 
which means to note that the AIDS catastrophe is ultimately due to a clash of 
incompatible logics of action.
60 The critical conflict arises in the domain of  patent 
rights to medicines and is the contradiction of norms of economic rationality with 
norms formed in the health context.
61 In this case the point is not, then, to impose 
price controls on particular pharmaceutical firms, but to develop abstract and general 
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rules on incompatibilities between the business sector and the health sector, and 
prepare WIPO, WTO and UN law, as part of a transnational patent law, to respond to 
destructive conflicts between incompatible logics of action by building health 
concerns into norms of economic rationality. Since there is no paramount court for 
the conflict, it can always only be solved from the viewpoint of one of the conflicting 
regimes, here the WTO. But the competing logic of action, here the principles of the 
health system, has to brought into the economic-law context as a limitation. 
  
It is, however, to be feared that the genuine human-rights dimension will not 
be adequately taken into account. In other words, if access to medication is not 
lastingly improved by the measures now decided and the planned WIPO treaties, 
then the transnational development of patent law in relation to pharmaceutical 
products will have to be adjusted again, whether by granting, in transparent, 
procedurally simplified and low-cost fashion, the right to compulsory licensing, or by a 
licence or patent exception system graded according to economic capacity, or finally 
by the radical cure of a general settlement completely removing certain medicines 
from the protection of transnational patent law for a period.
62 
 
This sketch of legal ways to react to the AIDS catastrophe shows the 
inappropriateness of the optimism that the human-rights problem can be solved using 
the resources of legal policy. Even institutional rights confront the law with the 
boundaries between other social subsystems. Can one discourse do justice to the 
other? This is a problem the dilemmas of which have been analysed by Lyotard.
63 
But it is at least a problem within society, one Luhmann sought to respond to with the 
concept of justice as socially adequate complexity.
64 The situation is still more 
dramatic with human rights in the strict sense, located at the boundary between 
communication and the individual human being. All the groping attempts to juridify 
human rights cannot hide the fact that this is a strictly impossible project. How can 
society ever “do justice” to real people if people are not its parts but stand outside 
communication, if society cannot communicate with them but at most about them, 
indeed not even reach them but merely either irritate or destroy them? In the light of 
grossly inhuman social practices the justice of human rights is a burning issue, but 
one which has no prospect of resolution. This has to be said in all rigour. 
 
If a positive concept of justice in the relation between communication and 
human being is definitively impossible, then what is left, if we are not to succumb to 
post-structuralist quietism, is only second best. In the law, we have to accept that the 
                                                 
62 Correa, Carlos and Musungu, Sisule (2002): The WIPO Patent Agenda: The Risk for Developing 
Countries, South Center Working Papers 12/2002, at: 
www.southcentre.org/publications/wipopatent/toc.htm; see also Helfer, Laurence (2004): "Regime 
Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intelectual Property Lawmaking", 
29 Yale Journal of International Law, 1 et seq.; generally on the regulation in the domain of bio-
technology: Stoll, Peter-Tobias (2004): "Biotechnologische Innovationen: Konflikte und rechtliche 
Ordnung", in: Hèritier, Adrienne, Stolleis, Michael and Scharpf, Fritz (eds.): European and International 
Regulation after the Nation State. Different Scopes and Multiple Levels, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 261 et 
seq. 
63 Lyotard, Jean-Francois (1988): The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, Manchester: Manchester Univ. 
Press, cif. 1 et seq. 
64 Luhmann, Niklas (1974): Rechtssystem und Rechtsdogmatik, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer; Luhmann, 
Niklas (1981): Ausdifferenzierung des Rechts: Beiträge zur Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie, 
Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 374 et seq.; Luhmann (fn. 36),  214 et seq.   19
problem of body/mind-integrity can be experienced only through the inadequate 
sensors of irritation, reconstruction and re-entry. The deep dimension of conflicts 
between communication, mind and body can at best be guessed at by law. And the 
only signpost left is the legal prohibition, through which a self-limitation of 
communication seems possible. But even this prohibition can describe the 
transcendence of the other only allegorically. This programme of justice is ultimately 
doomed to fail, and cannot just, with Derrida, console itself that it is “to come, à 
venir”,
65 but has to face up to being in principle impossible. The justice of human 
rights can, then, at best be formulated negatively. It is aimed at removing unjust 
situations, not creating just ones. It is only the counter-principle to communicative 
violations of body and soul, a protest against inhumanities of communication, without 
it ever being possible to say positively what the conditions of “humanly just” 
communication might be. 
  
Nor do the emancipatory programmes of modernity help any further. No 
information comes from criteria of democratic involvement of individuals in social 
processes, since only persons take part, not bodies nor minds. From this viewpoint 
one can only be amazed at the naïvety of participatory romanticism. Democratic 
procedures are no test of a society’s human rights justice.
66 Equally uninformative 
are universalization theories that proceed transcendentally via a priori characteristics 
or via a posteriori universalization of expressed needs. What do such philosophical 
abstractions have to do with actual human individuals? The same applies to 
economic theories of individual preferences aggregated through market mechanisms. 
 
Only the self-observation of mind/body – introspection, suffering, pain – can 
judge whether communication infringes human rights. If these self-observations, 
however distorted, gain entry to communication, then there is some chance of 
humanly just self-limitation of communication. The decisive thing is the “moment”: the 
simultaneity of consciousness and communication; the cry that expresses pain. 
Hence the closeness of justice to spontaneous indignation, unrest, protest, and its 
remoteness from philosophical, political and legal discourses. 
 
                                                 
65 Derrida, Jacques (1990): "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority", 11 Cardozo Law 
Review, 919 et seq., at 969. 
66 Even if there is no doubt that democratic procedures might increase political sensitivity concerning 
human rights issues.  